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Industrialising the marine commons: adapting to change in Europe’s coastal fisheries 
 
David Symes and Jeremy Phillipson 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The uncontrolled growth of distant water fishing in the NE Atlantic during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries marked a defining period in the evolution of world fisheries. Its collapse 
in the 1970s following the enclosure of the marine commons precipitated the establishment of 
new management regimes that struggled to bring exploitation levels within sustainable limits. 
The chapter explores two themes that dominate fisheries social science at the outset of the 
twenty first century: the search for inclusive governance and the means of securing social 
sustainability for those 'living the fishing'. 
 
 
 
 
Rise and fall of distant water fishing 
 
Fishing is widely recognised as one of the most dangerous and physically demanding 
occupations that may require crews to work up to 18 hours a day for several days on end in 
appalling conditions in return for uncertain and sometimes quite meagre returns. Such 
unsocial working arrangements require major adjustments to family life (Williams 2008), 
sometimes putting unbearable pressure on marital relations (Vervaele 2014). Governed by 
vicissitudes of the weather, rhythms of the seasons and the variability of complex, dynamic 
ecosystems, no economic activity is so directly influenced by environmental conditions. 
Fishing remains, in practice, a hunting economy albeit one that has been technologically 
enhanced. It is also a peripheral activity commonly associated with less developed rural 
areas. Highly fragmented and widely dispersed, the fishing industry is characterised by small 
scale enterprises mainly in family ownership. Poorly organised at national and regional levels 
and often weakly integrated into the wider business community, it usually commands little 
political influence. 
 
The world's capture fisheries are a finite resource, renewable under precautionary 
management but limited by the carrying capacities of ocean ecosystems. Modernisation and 
expansion of the fishing industry that began in the second half of the nineteenth century in the 
north east Atlantic, spread throughout the rest of the world during the twentieth century. A 
remarkable surge in global fishing capacity between circa 1960 and 1995 led to the world's 
capture fisheries becoming fully exploited. Stocks fished within biologically sustainable 
limits fell from 90% in 1974 to 71% in 2011 by which date roughly 30% of global fish stocks 
were 'overfished', 60% 'fully fished' and only 10% 'underfished' (FAO 2014). 
 
The following analysis of key issues confronting capture fisheries as a consequence of 
‘industrialising the commons’ is framed by the north east Atlantic, historically the most 
heavily exploited of the world’s fishing regions bordered by countries that formed the 
heartland of the industrial revolution in the 18th and 19th centuries. Its present political 
geography is striking – dominated by the European Union (EU) of 28 nation states, with four 
much smaller coastal or island states (Norway, Iceland, Greenland and the Faeroe Islands) 
and a fragment of the Russian Federation coastline on the Baltic shore. Overall fishing makes 
only a small contribution to the regional economy in terms of output, GDP or employment, 
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accounting for around 0.3% of GDP in the EU, though significantly higher levels in the 
smaller independent states where fishing related issues can take on national political 
significance. 
 
Traditionally forming part of a pluriactive coastal economy, the inclusion of fishing within 
the rural world is becoming tenuous. Fishing takes place in marine rather than terrestrial 
space, with an increasing urbanisation of land based, fishing related activities. Nevertheless 
fishing shares many cultural, social and economic features associated with the utilisation of 
other natural resources (in particular farming) and many of the issues affecting marginal rural 
areas. 
 
Industrialising the commons 
 
Industrialising the commons is a term more readily associated with the development of 
marine hydrocarbon and renewable energy industries around the coasts of north west Europe 
over the last 40 years. It sits much less easily with the structures and practices of the fishing 
industry. Yet, in a very real sense, industrialisation of the fishing industry did occur on a 
relatively limited scale in the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, 
following the introduction of steam powered fishing vessels and adoption of the otter trawl, 
with the development of Europe’s distant water fleets engaged in the relentless pursuit of the 
ubiquitous and iconic cod throughout the North Atlantic (Kurlansky 1997). The exploitation 
of distant water fishing grounds off Iceland, North Norway and later Greenland amounted to 
a ‘colonisation’ of their coastal waters by the more developed industrial nations of western 
Europe (UK, Germany, Belgium and France). Successive waves of technological innovation 
affecting vessel and gear design, culminating in the development of onboard refrigeration and 
the creation of factory trawlers in the 1950s and 60s, completed the process of 
industrialisation1. Production peaked in 1974 when over a thousand distant water vessels 
operating out of western and eastern European ports landed circa 2.2 million tonnes (Warner 
1977). Already the warning signs of a depleted fishery – falling catch per unit of effort and 
increasing numbers of small fish in the catch – were evident. 
 
In the context of fishing, industrialisation describes a combination of features associated with 
distant water fishing similar to those associated with the industrial revolution in eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century Europe. These include increasing levels of resource exploitation; 
specialisation, economies of scale and concentration of production; substitution of capital for 
labour; company ownership; partial involvement in a wage economy and the casualization of 
labour (Tunstall 1962); and the emergence of hierarchical social relations. Distant water 
fishing was essentially urban based, typically forming ‘encapsulated’ working class 
communities of deckhands close to the fish dock, with the ships’ officers (skippers, engineers 
and wireless operators) dispersed into the ‘leafy’ middle class suburbs (Horobin 1957). Such 
features were, however, atypical of the North Atlantic fishing industry as a whole where over 
80% of fishing enterprises were involved in simple commodity production mainly within 
local inshore fisheries. But the economic footprint of the large scale ‘industrial’ sector was 
profound, accounting for a rapidly expanding share of total output and dominating a market 
in which volume of production was judged more important than quality of the product. 
 
                                               
1  The huge Russian fleet of mother ships and factory trawlers, based mainly in Murmansk, 
operated primarily in the north west Atlantic off the coasts of the USA, Canada and Greenland. 
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The most significant long term impact of industrialising the commons – depletion of 
commercial fish stocks and growing evidence of fishing down the food chain – was not 
confined to distant water fishing grounds. Economies of scale, technological innovation and 
increasing fishing effort had diffused throughout near and middle water fisheries, so that 
overfishing had become endemic throughout much of the north Atlantic. In the North Sea, for 
example, although overall biomass remained relatively constant throughout the twentieth 
century and the level of total catches high, the composition of the catch had altered with 
declines in major food fish species and increases in landings of lower value ‘industrial’ 
species for reduction to fishmeal and oil, though the boom in these industrial fisheries was to 
prove shortlived. 
 
Enclosing the commons 
 
The colonisation of distant water fishing grounds and industrialisation of the commons owed 
much to the principle of freedom of the high seas and the ungoverned and ungovernable 
nature of the ocean commons. Belated attempts to fill the institutional vacuum with the 
establishment of the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission in 1959 (Sen 1997) met with 
limited success. Solving what Hardin (1968) called the ‘tragedy of the commons’ would 
require two separate actions: enclosure and privatisation of the commons. Enclosing the 
commons was achieved from the late 1970s onwards through the contagious spread of 200 
mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), initially promulgated in the North Atlantic by 
Iceland to provide protection for commercial fish stocks in its coastal waters, and 
subsequently endorsed in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1982. 
 
The impact of enclosure was dramatic with winners and losers easily identified. Within a few 
years little remained of the distant water fishing industry: a handful of trawlers from countries 
like the UK, Germany and Belgium were licensed to fish for limited quota in the newly 
enclosed northern waters. The only significant survivors of industrial scale fishing were the 
relatively small numbers of large, technologically sophisticated pelagic trawlers and purse 
seiners in pursuit of the highly migratory herring and mackerel. The fishing seasons are short 
but intensive: in 2008 the average pelagic vessel in Scotland spent only 54 days at sea 
(Scottish Government 2010). The winners were the coastal fishing industries of Iceland, 
Faeroes and Norway, free to exploit their own rich fishing grounds no longer outmuscled by 
more powerful foreign distant fleets. The losers were countries like the UK that had relied 
heavily on distant water landings to supply their domestic markets. The ports of Hull and 
Grimsby, that together boasted the greatest concentration of distant water fishing capacity, 
witnessed the dispersal of their fleets of modern freezer trawlers and the decimation of their 
function as major fishing ports. The balance of power within the NE Atlantic had shifted. 
 
New management regimes 
 
Realising the benefits of improved fisheries management within the enclosed commons has 
proved difficult. ‘Privatising the commons’ – Hardin’s favoured action – through allocation 
of transferable fishing rights to individual fishing enterprises, was intended to let the market 
find an efficient solution to excess capacity in the fishing industry. Despite vigorous 
endorsement by some fisheries economists (Munro and Pitcher 1996) privatisation has 
proved politically contentious and slow to take root in the North Atlantic. Only Iceland, and 
more recently Denmark in 2007, have legislated for the formal introduction of ITQs 
(individual transferable quotas) though quota management systems in certain EU member 
states have informally adopted the principle of transferability. Most coastal states opted to 
contain the rising pressure on fish stocks through regulatory frameworks based on output 
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controls (total allowable catches and vessel quotas) supported by effort restrictions (days at 
sea) and technical conservation measures2. Such systems achieved limited success: the 
politicisation of decision making meant that output limits were often set too high; policing of 
regulations tended to be patchy; and, worst of all, the policy instrument (quota) became a 
major part of the problem when vessels routinely discarded over quota fish at sea (Johnsen 
and Eliasen 2011). Only in the last decade or so has the NE Atlantic witnessed a sustained 
recovery of its most important demersal species. 
 
Weaknesses in management had arguably more to do with institutional failings than with 
ineffective regulation. In the EU the decision was taken to merge the EEZs of coastal member 
states to create a single ‘common pond’ managed from Brussels through the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP). The rationale for a unified approach made good sense at least while 
the focus of interest was limited to the North Sea but became increasingly implausible with 
successive enlargements of the Union. In a centrally driven and science based system of 
fisheries management the EU Commission became directly responsible3 for micro-managing 
the world’s most complex and diverse fishing zone, extending through 40° of latitude. 
Involvement of the fishing industry in the policy process has been restricted to participation 
in advisory committees that exercise only a limited influence on policy decisions, leading 
Sissenwine and Symes (2007: 51) to conclude that “…  the CFP has lost the confidence of its 
client group (the fishing industry) and the public at large. The very legitimacy of the CFP is 
being challenged”. The narrow focus on conserving commercial stocks and the technocratic 
approach to management implied an abstraction from the reality of dynamic marine 
ecosystems, rejection of the principles of common resource management (Ostrom 1990) and 
a denial of the basic truth that managing coastal fisheries is a much more complex 'wicked 
problem' (Jentoft and Chuenpagdee 2009). It had the effect of disembedding fishing and 
fisheries from the environmental, economic and social contexts that shape their existence. 
 
Fundamental reform of the CFP's centralised, top down approach and its narrow terms of 
reference has so far proved almost impossible. The reasons for the apparent stalemate are 
clear: the institutional lock-down imposed by the immutability of the Treaties that define the 
principles and procedures of the European Union; the reluctance of some member states to 
embrace radical reform for fear it would erode the principle of relative stability4; and the 
inevitability of compromise resulting from negotiations between different fishing interests 
and between the Council of Ministers and European Parliament, jointly responsible for 
signing off the final agreement. As a result, reforms of the CFP are set to follow a path 
dependent route (Hegland and Raakjaer 2008) that limits their scope to incremental changes 
to existing practices rather than transformational change. 
 
                                               
2  In 1996, following a brief dalliance with ITQs, the Faeroe Islands switched to a system of 
input restrictions involving the allocation of a specific number of fishing days to different classes of 
fishing vessels. 
3  Unusually, the EU Commission was granted ‘sole competence’ for formulating of policy 
proposals in respect of fisheries conservation; the decisions, approved by the Council of Ministries 
and European Parliament, are issued in the form of Regulations rather than the softer, more pliable 
Directives. 
4  Relative stability is based on fixed keys for allocation quota. 
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Not all responsibility for management rests with the EU institutions. Significant areas, 
including quota management and inshore fisheries, remain in the hands of the member states. 
Their decisions, mediated through negotiations with stakeholder organisations, reflect not 
only customary preferences relating to target species and fishing methods but also the 
structure of the industry and its organisation. As a result, national fishing industries tend to 
retain their distinctive identities and are subject to contrasting patterns of fisheries 
governance. 
 
A different set of circumstances faced the smaller, independent NE Atlantic states that rely on 
fisheries as a source of wealth creation and employment. Partly because of their small 
populations and the greater relative importance of the fisheries, a closer and more productive 
relationship exists between industry and government. In Norway, for example, in a system 
described by Hersoug and Rånes (1997: 157) as 'centrally directed consultation', fisheries 
representatives are present on several organisations that exert influence on fisheries policy. 
The Norwegian Fishermen's Association is consulted formally and informally on a range of 
policy issues, emerging as 'the government's fisheries partner' (Gezelius 2008: 43). 
 
Enclosure of the commons, intended to protect the small scale fisheries of Iceland, Norway 
and the Faeroes from overfishing by distant water fleets, exposed these fisheries to the 
demands of the Nordic welfare model (Andersen et al. 2007) that seeks to combine private 
prosperity with public wealth through high taxation. As a result, market based solutions, 
sometimes in the form of ITQs that ensure the fishing sector's profitability and productivity 
have tended to prevail over policies designed to secure social sustainability of small scale 
fisheries (Holm et al. 2015). 
 
From co-management to interactive governance 
 
Co-management 
 
Two broad themes – governance and sustainability – have come to dominate the social 
science literature on fisheries. In the first of these, studies of co-management, where 
responsibility for the implementation of policy is shared between state and fishing industry, 
provided an early entry point (Jentoft 1989). Ostensibly, the involvement of user groups 
assists in the adaptation of universal regulations to local circumstances. Co-management 
assumes many forms (Sen and Raakjaer Nielsen 1996) and is more widely associated with 
coastal and especially inshore fisheries where in some instances pre-modern organisations 
have been adapted to meet modern conditions. 
 
A recent example of deploying user groups in management is the network of self-governing 
producer organisations (POs) across the EU. Initially concerned with ensuring favourable 
conditions for the sale of their members' catches, POs in some member states have become 
directly involved in collective forms of quota management (Goodlad 1998). Under the 2013 
CFP reforms, POs will also assume responsibility for annual management plans linking 
production and marketing. 
 
Co-management is credited with introducing a range of attributes relating to good 
governance. In addition to increased rationality and legitimacy for the policy process and the 
regulatory system, it implies greater transparency, a broader basis of knowledge, lower 
transaction costs and enhanced levels of commitment and compliance from industry (Symes 
and Phillipson 1999). National studies (Phillipson 2002; Piriz 2004) can expose contextual 
and institutional factors that inhibit the efficacy of co-management. Of particular concern is 
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ensuring the appropriate balance of representation between different interest groups and their 
incorporation within the institutional design (Jentoft and McCay 1995). Such issues are 
intensified where the management remit is widened to include the interface between fisheries 
and the marine environment. 
 
Participative governance 
 
Whereas co-management usually involves stakeholders in the implementation of policy, 
participative governance seeks to engage them in the full range of policy formulation and 
implementation through user group representation at all stages of the policy process. Such 
developments are more strongly evident in Norway's corporative system of governance and at 
member state level (Hegland and Raakjaer 2008) than at EU level where participation is 
limited to a range of advisory committees, one step removed from decision making. A useful 
source of information and opinion, advisory committees have the ability to bring policy 
makers in Brussels more closely in touch with the realities of fishing across the strikingly 
different regional seas that make up the EU's 'common pond'. 
 
The EU has been reluctant to contemplate devolving any of its responsibilities in relation to 
resource conservation. The one exception has been the 1982 derogation in respect of the 12 
nm territorial waters that left their management largely in the hands of the coastal state. Only 
in parts of the UK, however, do we find a fully devolved system of inshore fisheries 
management (Phillipson and Symes 2010). 
 
During negotiations leading to the 2013 CFP reforms, a major area of debate was the 
suggestion in the Green Paper (Commission 2009) of introducing some form of regional 
management (see Symes 2009; Hegland et al. 2012). Despite support from many member 
states, the proposition eventually fell victim to legal arguments that the EU Treaties were 
unable to countenance an intermediate level of policy making that might challenge the status 
and authority of EU institutions. All that survived in the revised CFP were provisions for 
member states to collaborate in the implementation of common policy. 
 
Alternative approaches to governance 
 
 Towards the end of the twentieth century there was considerable academic and policy 
interest in moving away from narrowly defined and mechanistic forms of sectoral 
management and towards holistic, integrated approaches that could reembed fisheries 
management in the wider context of the marine environment. Of particular interest was the 
ecosystem based approach that according to Schramm and Hubert (1996: 6) represents “an 
evolution of management philosophy that focuses on local and large geographic scales, 
considers long term temporal scales and preserves biotic and abiotic components of 
ecosystems when making natural resource management decisions”. Although the approach is 
a guiding principle of the CFP, little effort has been made to develop operational objectives 
as a basis for its implementation. Significantly, one of the principal advantages to be gained 
from regionalising the CFP is the opportunity to develop management strategies around the 
specific ecosystems of the EU's regional seas.  
 
One impediment to an integrated approach to fisheries policy and management has been the 
absence of a robust theoretical framework capable of embracing the underlying 
environmental, economic and socio-cultural systems. Interactive governance theory 
(Kooiman et al. 2005) offers a comprehensive reconceptualisation of the governing system as 
a private-public partnership, involving public authorities, the market, fishing industry and 
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civil society. Central to its approach is recognising the diversity, complexity, scale and 
dynamics of fisheries and the need for flexibility within the governing system in order to 
maintain the essential diversity of the system to be governed. In contrast to the image of co-
management as a pragmatic response to a crisis in state-industry relations, interactive 
governance requires a new approach, building upwards from foundations in ethical values, 
carefully articulated governing principles and the incorporation of inclusivity, partnership and 
interactive learning among its principal characteristics (Symes 2006). 
 
It is hard to envisage interactive governance providing a template for reform of fisheries 
policy in the NE Atlantic in the foreseeable future. Its purpose might be better served in 
guiding the development of governing institutions in the global South (Bavinck et al. 2005). 
What interactive governance theory offers the developed world of the north Atlantic is a more 
powerful lens for analysing governing systems and a diagnostic tool for assessing how far the 
systems to be governed are in fact governable (Bavinck et al. 2013). 
 
Social sustainability 
 
The challenge 
 
Throughout the NE Atlantic fishing currently faces a concatenation of problems that pose an 
existential threat to coastal fisheries and their fishing communities. Resource depletion – a 
legacy of industrialising the commons and sustained by ineffective policy – and inadequate 
quota and rising costs of production set against unstable quayside prices, raise questions in 
the minds of younger generations over the benefits to be derived from a lifetime in fishing, 
especially in circumstances where an increasing burden of regulation eats away at the fishers' 
ability to deploy their skills, knowledge and experience in bringing home a good catch and 
providing a steady income (Williams 2008). The impacts of demographic transition, 
culminating in smaller household size and ageing coastal populations, and increasing spatial 
and social mobility have been to dilute and disperse local kin based networks that formerly 
provided the basis for crew selection (Symes and Frangoudes 2001). Recruitment of new 
entrants has become a problem in many fishing dependent areas – employment of non-local, 
sometimes immigrant, labour and the replacement of traditional share systems of 
remuneration by wage agreements are becoming more widespread. 
 
Possibly the biggest threat to social sustainability comes from privatisation of the commons 
and the adoption of ITQs, allowing the market to determine the size and structure of fishing 
fleets. An inconclusive debate over ITQs has pitted economists against other social scientists. 
There is little doubt that introducing ITQs helps create a more efficient industry with capacity 
closely aligned to available resources (Arnason 1993) but at very high cost in terms of 
employment, social equity and the sustainability of smaller coastal settlements (Eythorsson 
1996). In Iceland difficulties and high costs of acquiring quota are forcing younger fishers to 
pursue their ambitions abroad, notably in Norway. Not only do privatised fishing rights 
become financial assets in their own right and their ownership concentrated in fewer hands – 
in some cases non-fishing interests – but the structure of the industry tends to shift away from 
smaller family enterprises towards larger, possibly company owned, vessels. In one sense, 
therefore, the introduction of ITQs could usher in a second phase of 'industrialising the 
commons'. 
 
Competition for marine space from wildlife and water based recreation interests, as well as 
from new industrial uses including hydrocarbon and renewable sources of energy, threaten 
access to established fishing grounds. Onshore, there is further disruption through 
8 
 
'urbanisation' of the waterfront, where premium real estate values have led to the conversion 
of fishers' cottages into retirement and second home ownership. Similarly, larger commercial 
properties formerly associated with fishing have been converted into hotels, restaurants and 
retail outlets (Williams 2014). The absence of affordable housing in areas previously 
occupied by the fishing community has added to the problem of social renewal and the 
dispersal of the fishing community. As a result the cohesion of fishing communities is 
undermined and their identity challenged: functional working communities are replaced by 
'communities of the mind' (Ross 2015) sharing memories of a time when fishing was the 
centre of their universe. Throughout certain areas of the NE Atlantic we are witnessing the 
translation of 'real' fishing communities into 'virtual' fishing communities (Brookfield et al. 
2005), serving as a suitable backdrop to the burgeoning tourism industries. 
 
The nature and intensity of the existential threat varies throughout the NE Atlantic; it is at its 
most intense in the North Sea bordering some of Europe's old established industrial areas 
where coastal population densities are high and the range of competing uses are greatest. 
Intensity declines as one moves north or south and the challenge assumes more specific 
identities: second home ownership and recreational fishing interests in the Baltic and sun 
seeking, tourism related pressures along Britain's south coast and France's Atlantic coastline. 
Although the pressures are arguably weaker in the mid-Atlantic states of Iceland and the 
Faeroe Islands and in North Norway, their impact is more pronounced simply because of the 
stronger role of fishing related activities in the national or regional economy. 
 
Such developments provide fertile ground for social analysis at the level of the fisheries 
dependent region, the fishing community and the fisher household. Overall the content of the 
social science literature has seen a shift towards a more structured analysis of fishers' 
livelihoods and greater attention to fisher households as the organising framework for coastal 
fishing and their crucial roles as the agencies for mediating the industry's response to its 
changing fortunes. 
 
Living the fishing: sustaining livelihoods and quality of life 
 
Guaranteeing access to fishing opportunities for all who fish is no longer feasible. Arguably 
more important and certainly more challenging is the task of ensuring the identity, dignity 
and well being of those able to pursue the distinctive way of life associated with fishing. 
While some involved in coastal fishing are guided by instrumental values with ambitions to 
earn a reputation based upon conspicuous financial success, for the majority the motivation is 
a combination of intrinsic, social and individual values. In an industry where the risks are 
high, the work demanding and the financial rewards uncertain, the identity, status and 
satisfaction of being a fisher is defined rather less by material achievement and more by their 
independence, self-employment and reliance on personal skills, knowledge and experience. 
However, the skipper is not an autonomous agent but dependent on the skills, experience and 
reliability of a crew with whom he must develop a close knit, trust based relationship and 
share the risks and rewards (Palsson 1994). While these attributes are ascribed to the fishers, 
they are reflected, mediated and ultimately supported from within the family household and 
more widely throughout the fishing community. 
 
Whatever the time scale –  the next fishing trip, next year or the next generation – the future 
in fishing is always uncertain and to a large degree unpredictable. Fishers and their families 
must live essentially adaptive lives, responding to the rhythm of the seasons, the 
unpredictability of conditions at sea – and therefore of catch and income – and the changing 
expectations of policy makers. In contrast to specialised large scale enterprises operating in 
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offshore waters, coastal fishers usually rely upon diversity and flexibility of their operations. 
Small scale fishers are in essence multi-skilled and their boats designed to accommodate a 
variety of métiers. At the heart of the adaptability of the coastal fishing enterprise is the 
largely undervalued and often invisible roles of fisher wives active in managing the family 
household, servicing the needs of the fishing enterprise and often providing an invaluable 
source of additional household income (Nadel-Klein 2003). Fisher households today display 
a much less rigid set of roles and relationships; less centred upon the fishing enterprise per se. 
In the longer term, as women become become distanced from the fishers occupationally and 
emotionally and more sceptical towards socialising their children with a view to a future in 
fishing, the transmission of a traditional coastal culture will be weakened, putting its future in 
some doubt (Petterson 2001). 
 
Faced with disruption to the normal pattern of fishing activity caused by unpredicted 
environmental, economic or policy related events, the response of individual fishing 
enterprises will vary. Among the factors influencing the response are the structure of the 
family household, its financial circumstances, latent sources of labour and/or skill and how its 
members evaluate the importance of living the fishing; the availability of alternative 
employment opportunities locally; and the ability and willingness of family members to move 
elsewhere. Petterson (1996) examining the response of coastal fishers in the Lofoten Islands 
in north Norway to the collapse of northern cod stocks identified four alternative strategies: 
expansion and diversification, favoured by younger, more flexible households, and  
retrenchment and withdrawal affecting older households, close to retirement and with 
increased dependence on welfare payments. 
 
Being adaptive incurs both financial and emotional costs (Britton 2014). Few options are 
neutral in terms of their implications for different household members. For men, withdrawal 
is difficult: the accumulated assets (vessel, gears) and fishing skills are largely non-
transferable and a move into non-fishing employment or premature retirement implies some 
loss of identity and status within the community. For women, expansion or diversification is 
likely to add to their workloads and to the stress of managing the family household. The 
impacts of adaptive change will be distributed unevenly across the fishing community, 
between fishing enterprises and within fisher households. The sustainability of coastal 
fisheries and living the fishing depends to a significant extent on the overall balance of 
decisions taken within a large number fisher households (Broch 2013). 
 
Squaring the circle 
 
Recently two different but complementary developments have occurred that could help to 
give greater structure and direction to adaptive strategies designed to promote sustainability 
of coastal fisheries and fishing dependent areas by reconnecting them with their 
environmental, economic and socio-cultural roots. The first of these is theoretical and 
involves the application of 'resilience thinking' to coastal fisheries. Resilience thinking had its 
origins in ecosystem resilience (Holling 1973) and was later adapted (Berkes and Folke 1998) 
to suit the circumstances surrounding coastal and more especially inshore fisheries. It is based 
on the integration of local ecological and social systems so as to maintain the rich diversity of 
local ecosystems – vulnerable to disturbance from environmental changes and overfishing – 
and the integrity of local social systems through management approaches that safeguard the 
flexibility and adaptability of small scale, low impact fishing. 
 
A resilience based approach involves a deeper understanding of the functioning of both 
systems, avoidance of  simplistic quantitative management approaches and their replacement 
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by more sensitive, parametric measures (Wilson and Dickie 1995) that relate more closely to 
life cycle behaviours of the target species, thus embracing a genuine ecosystem based 
approach. It requires fishing effort to vary in line with natural fluctuations of fish and 
shellfish stocks and to be maintained at levels set below the ecosystem's carrying capacity. 
Above all, 'living the fishing' means living with uncertainty rather than constantly battling 
against it. Resilience building strategies should focus not only on securing the sustainability 
of individual fishing enterprises but also the overall integrity, flexibility and dynamics of the 
ecological and social systems. 
 
The theme of creating a new symbiosis between coastal fisheries, the marine environment 
and the wider local economy is continued in a more recent development related to the 
funding arrangements to support the implementation of the EU's common policy. Axis 4 of 
the European Fisheries Fund (2007-13) makes provision for a separate funding stream to 
assist the sustainable development of fishing dependent areas in an approach that is modelled 
on the earlier LEADER programme for rural areas. Axis 4 funding is available to support 
both marine and inland fisheries development. It establishes a means of delivering local 
potentials for increased resilience by charting a 'middle way' between the frequently 
divergent sectoral and territorial approaches to development (Phillipson and Symes 2015), in 
which diversification is interpreted not as providing alternatives to fishing but as a way of 
complementing fishing activity. 
 
Implementing Axis 4 objectives involves a network of self-governing Fisheries Local Action 
Groups (FLAGs) – partnerships between fishing, local business interests and community 
interest groups. Their tasks include the preparation of a development strategy articulating the 
needs of the local fishing industry and the subsequent selection, nurturing and part funding of 
projects initiated by individuals or groups of fishers that would add value to the local catch, 
generate additional employment within or outwith the fisher household or improve the area's 
environmental quality. Projects range from new product development, direct sales of catch 
within and beyond the local area, through ecotourism, fishing heritage and educational 
initiatives, to water quality improvement and wildlife conservation inter alia. Although Axis 
4 has still to be fully evaluated, early results (see FARNET 2015; van de Walle et al. 2015) 
are encouraging, both in relation to employment generation and closer integration with the 
local business community. Its rapid diffusion throughout the EU – with over 300 FLAGs 
established and more than 9000 projects at some stage of implementation at the end of 2014 – 
and its retention within the next funding programme (2014-2020) provide further indications 
of its perceived potential in strengthening the resilience of fishing communities and securing 
sustainable development for coastal fishing in the EU. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Many of the issues concerning the governance and social sustainability of capture fisheries 
discussed above will be played out on a global stage over the next two decades. In the NE 
Atlantic there is evidence of improving systems of fisheries governance based in part on 
increasing stakeholder participation and recognition of the need to reembed fisheries in their 
distinctive social, cultural and environmental contexts. A number of residual battles, 
especially in relation to small scale fisheries, still have to be won. 
 
In the global South outcomes will vary markedly, shaped by intrinsic regional conditions, 
resilience of local institutions and the power play between indigenous coastal interests, 
emerging political élites and global pressures for market based solutions to the distribution of 
fishing rights. The struggle to retain fishing opportunities in the hands of local fishing 
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interests as a basis for local employment, economic development and food security will be 
crucial; and the success of the UN project to embed small scale, indigenous fishing rights in a 
robust system of human rights could be vital. 
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